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Introduction 
Performance-Related Pay:  A NIESR Review Special Issue 
 
 
 Keith A. Bender Alex Bryson 
 Business School and CELMR NIESR and  
 University of Aberdeen Centre for Economic Performance, LSE 
 
 
Introduction 
From First Principles, one of the key implications of standard labour economic theory is that 
workers should be paid their marginal product.  Pay that is tied to a worker's performance, 
therefore, would seem to provide the most direct link to satisfy this theoretical requirement 
(Lazear 1986).  Indeed, there is ample evidence that indicates that implementing pay for 
performance increases productivity through a combination of increased incentives for high 
productivity and incentives for highly productive workers to sort themselves into these types 
of jobs (e.g., Lazear 2000, Haley 2003, Gielen et al. 2010, Jones et al. 2010 and Bryson et al. 
2013).  Because of these potentially beneficial attributes of performance related pay, much 
research has been devoted to identifying how widespread the pay practice is compared to 
other methods of compensation, how it has changed over time, how it is viewed by different 
labour market actors and whether it correlates (positively or negatively) with other labour 
market outcomes, as well as a host of other research questions.   
 
The goal of this Special Issue, therefore, is to bring together three papers that examine 
different aspects of performance pay.  It is, by no means, intended to span the width and 
breadth of the literature or even to summarise this large literature.  Rather, it is to offer papers 
that discuss particularly interesting or different ways of thinking about performance pay.  As 
such, they add significantly to our overall knowledge of performance pay in labour markets. 
 
Trends in Performance Pay 
One of the themes in the literature is to understand how prevalent performance-related pay is.  
One of the first problems, however, in doing this is determining an exact definition of 
performance pay, since continued employment is nearly always dependent upon satisfactory 
performance (Prendergast 1999).  Performance pay is generally considered to be any 
potentially variable payment based on performance above a fixed amount of compensation 
(typically tied to the number of hours in employment).  However, even with this definition, 
there is a good deal of diversity in the type of performance measured, which can range from 
individual performance (e.g., piece rates or commissions), to group performance (e.g., gain-
sharing) to firm performance (e.g., profit sharing or stock ownership plans).  Thus, in the 
literature there is great variation in the proportions of workers in performance pay dependent 
upon what definition is used.  Interestingly, given the labour market benefits of performance-
related pay mentioned above, one might expect that, regardless of the way it is measured, the 
level of performance related pay would be high in market-oriented economies, where firms 
are trying to maximise profits.  However, this does not seem to be the case with most 
European countries having relatively low incidence rates of 10-15% rising to around 40% for 
Scandinavia and the United States (Bryson et al. 2013) for private sector workers.  
 
Understanding the incidence and trends in performance pay in the US labour market is the 
focus of the first paper in this Issue by Maury Gittleman and Brooks Pierce of the US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.  They use unique micro data from the Employer Costs for Employee 
Compensation (ECEC) series that comes from the National Compensation Survey (NCS).  
While aggregated data from this survey are used widely in describing employee cost data in 
the United States, the micro data allow the researchers to identify different types of 
performance pay since 1994, allowing them not only to calculate incidence rates for different 
types of performance pay, but also what the trends in performance pay have been since 1994.  
The data are also unusual in this literature in that it is reported by employers rather than the 
more common worker-level survey evidence that is in much of the rest of the literature.  They 
find that performance pay affects 19% of the US workforce under their ‘narrow’ definition 
(i.e. including incentive pay jobs and nonproduction bonuses that are designed to align 
productivity and pay) to 37% under their ‘broad’ definition (i.e. the ‘narrow’ definition as 
well as any nonproduction bonuses) in 2013.  Differences in incidence across a limited range 
of worker and firm characteristics show greater performance pay among information and 
financial industries, smaller firms, sales and management occupations, the more highly 
educated, the more highly paid, full time workers and nonunion workers.  Interestingly, they 
also find that the incidence has fallen in the US, particularly since the early 2000s. 
 
Performance Pay and the Business Cycle 
Related to this research on examining the incidence and trends of performance pay is what 
happens to performance related pay over the business cycle.  One might expect that the 
increased flexibility in pay allows firms to adjust wages rather than employment levels in 
response to changes in demand (Lemieux et al., 2012), indicating a procyclical relationship.  
Hourly rates of pay based on salaries, on the other hand, are often found to be 
countercyclical, being relatively high when the economy is declining and relatively low when 
the economy is strengthening.  This is of obvious relevance currently as developed economies 
are struggling to recover from the severe recession of the late 2000s. 
 
To give some guidance on this topic, Robert A. Hart and J. Elizabeth Roberts examine 
historical data from manufacturers in the UK around the Great Depression.  Using regional 
variations in payment schemes, they are able to identify payments that are primarily piece 
rates (in southern UK areas) or time rates (in northern UK regions).  Payroll data from firms 
associated with the British Engineering Employers’ Federation indicate that hourly wages in 
the north, where the prevalence of piece rates was relatively small, were countercyclical 
during the Great Depression.  On the other hand, while time rates for southern workers were 
also generally countercyclical, earnings from piece rates were procyclical, mitigating 
employment losses during the Great Depression, particularly in relation to northern regions of 
the UK. 
 
Performance Pay and Trade Unions 
As the research outlined above shows, the incidence of performance pay is likely lower than 
theory might predict.  Multiple reasons have been given for this.  For example, the transaction 
costs for observing and evaluating performance may be prohibitively high leading to a 
reluctance by firms to offer such compensation schemes.  Risk averse workers will also be 
less likely to want more variable performance pay, particularly if there are factors beyond 
their control that affect productivity (indeed it could even lead to lower job satisfaction, 
ceteris paribus, as suggested by Pouliakis and Theodossiou, 2009).  There have also been a 
host of unintended consequences that potentially could plague performance pay if the 
contracts are not specified well.  For example there can be ‘adverse specialisation’ 
(MacDonald and Marx, 2001) where quantity is prioritised over quality or physical capital is 
overused.  Other research (Freeman and Kleiner, 2005) finds that piece rates give incentives 
to employ inefficient levels of other inputs.  Performance pay has also been found to be 
correlated with higher worker compensation premia (Freeman and Kleiner, 2005), increased 
injury rates (Bender et al., 2012) and worse health (Bender and Theodossiou, 2013). 
 
Another reason given for the low incidence of performance-related pay is the opposition by 
trade unions.  Freeman (1982) argues that since performance-related pay increases earnings 
dispersion, it would disrupt union solidarity and, thus, unions would be opposed to the 
implementation of pay for performance.  However, subsequent research has found a less 
consistent pattern of unions and performance pay.  This issue is the focus of the paper by 
Patrick O’Halloran who examines longitudinal data from the US National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) to examine the relationship between unions and different 
kinds of performance related pay, controlling for a wide range of personal characteristics as 
well as fixed effects.  He reveals a complex pattern of negative correlations between 
unionisation and payment using commissions, bonuses and stock options, while there is 
actually a positive relationship between unionisation and piece rates, ceteris paribus.  
O’Halloran suggests that a nonnegative relationship between unions and performance pay 
might occur if the union has some control over the implementation and procedures used in 
the particular performance pay scheme. 
 
Thus, these papers offer different perspectives on performance based pay.  As all good 
research does, they both inform and offer new ways forward for the literature to examine new 
questions. 
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